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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Mr. Davis appeals, challenging the restitution order entered in his case. The 
restitution award was for damages done to a dirt bike which Mr. Davis bought under 
circumstances under which he should have reasonably believed to the dirt bike to have 
been stolen. The error in the award was for damages to the dirt bike for which 
Mr. Davis was not the proximate cause, or, alternatively, for which there was an 
intervening cause. The State responds, simply asserting that the damages to the dirt 
bike, caused by a third party, were reasonably foreseeable without explaining why that 
is so. The damages, caused by a third party, were not, given all the information in the 
record, reasonably foreseeable. Given the Court of Appeals' recent decisions further 
explaining causation as it relates to restitution, the district court's restitution order 
erroneously ordered Mr. Davis to pay restitution for damages which he had not been 
proven to have caused. 
Therefore, this Court should vacate the restitution award for costs which the 
State failed to prove were caused by Mr. Davis's criminal conduct. Alternatively, if the 
record is not sufficiently clear to determine the amount of the damages caused by 
Mr. Davis, this Court should remand the case for a limited hearing to determine the 
value of the parts Mr. Davis admitted to damaging and the cost to replace only those 
parts. 
1 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated 
in Mr. Davis's Appellant's Brief. They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are 
incorporated herein by reference thereto. 
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ISSUE 
Whether the district court erred by awarding restitution for damages when Mr. Davis 
was not the cause of those damages? 
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ARGUMENT 
The District Court Erred By Awarding Restitution For Damages When Mr. Davis Was 
Not The Cause Of Those Damages 
Over the last few months, the Idaho Court of Appeals has issued several 
decisions which further explain the application of causation analysis in the restitution 
context. See State v. Eddins,_ P.3d _, 2014 WL 503492 (Ct. App. Feb. 10, 2014) 
(not yet final); State v. Hurles,_ P.3d _, 2014 WL 185977 (Ct. App. Jan. 17, 2014), 
pet. rev. pending; State v. Houser, 155 Idaho 521 (Ct. App. 2013). The rules and 
analysis in these decisions are applicable to this case and demonstrate that, because 
Mr. Kearl's behavior broke the causal connection between Mr. Davis's criminal conduct 
and some of the losses suffered by the dirt bike's owner, the restitution order for those 
losses is inappropriate. 
In Houser, the Court of Appeals addressed the burden of proof that the State 
must meet in order to justify a restitution award. Houser, 155 Idaho 521. Because the 
State had failed to provide substantial evidence demonstrating that the loss claimed 
(wages for missed work so the victim could attend various court hearings) was caused 
by the defendant's criminal conduct, as opposed to the victim's voluntary choice to not 
return to work once those hearings ended. Id. at 528. 
Similarly, in this case, the State has failed to provide substantial evidence that 
the damages to the dirt bike were attributable to Mr. Davis's criminal conduct. The 
evidence demonstrates that Mr. Kearl, who had purchased the dirt bike from Mr. Davis, 
was riding the dirt bike when officers contacted him. (See Tr., Vol.2, p.14, Ls.17-23.) 
The record also demonstrates that Mr. Davis had the bike for two days, while Mr. Kearl 
had the bike over the ensuing weekend. ( See App. Br., p.13 n.11.) The State's 
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witnesses also testified that the damage to the frame of the dirt bike was the result of 
crashing the dirt bike. (Tr., Vol.1, p.39, Ls.11-13; Tr., Vol.1, p.51, Ls.1-3.) The only 
evidence about the condition of the dirt bike when it was sold to Mr. Kearl was 
Mr. Davis's testimony. (See generally Tr.) Mr. Davis admitted to modifying parts of the 
dirt bike, but otherwise, had left it in the same condition in which it had been when 
another person took it from the owner. (Tr., Vol.2, p.8, L.3 - p.9, L.11; R., pp.7, 12.) 
The evidence also demonstrates that the dirt bike was in good condition when it was 
taken from the owner. (Tr., Vol.1, p.45, Ls.16-21.) Therefore, the evidence 
demonstrates that it was Mr. Kearl, not Mr. Davis, who caused the damage to the frame 
of the dirt bike. 
As such, the remaining question is whether Mr. Kearl's behavior was 
foreseeable, or whether it constituted an intervening, superseding cause. Just because 
a loss was suffered does not mean it was foreseeable. See Hurles, P.3d , 2014 - -
WL 185977 at 11 (discussing the decisions in State v. Waidelich, 140 Idaho 622, 624 
(Ct. App. 2004), and State v. Parker, 143 Idaho 165, 168 (Ct. App. 2006), pointing out 
that the loss in each was caused by an independent action by the respective victim 
which was not necessary to address the damages caused by the defendant's criminal 
conduct, and thus, was not recoverable as restitution). Here, the State's entire 
argument about the application of the proximate cause rules to this case is as follows: 
The law dictates that crime victims are entitled to restitution for economic 
losses that are actually and proximately caused by the defendant's 
criminal conduct. I.C. § 19-5304; Corbus, 150 Idaho at 602, 249 P.3d at 
401. Because it was a reasonably foreseeable result that the stolen bike 
Davis disposed of would end up damaged, proximate cause has been 
established. 
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(Resp. Br., p.7.) That conclusory statement does not address the fact that the Idaho 
Supreme Court was clear in Lampien, that "[i]n most contexts, a crime or intentional tort 
constitutes an 'independent intervening cause' that precludes a defendant's antecedent 
crime from being a proximate cause." State v. Lampien, 148 Idaho 367, 374 (2007). 
Given that Mr. Kearl was getting the same dirt bike under similar circumstances as 
Mr. Davis had, Mr. Kearl should have been aware that the dirt bike was stolen. That 
means Mr. Kearl committed a crime, which constitutes an independent intervening 
cause, and therefore, made Mr. Davis's antecedent crime not the proximate cause of 
the damages. Id. Therefore, the restitution award for damages Mr. Kearl caused to the 
dirt bike were inappropriate. 
The State's conclusory argument is based on the State's discussion of the 
opinions in State v. Corbus, 150 Idaho 599 (2011 ), and State v. Cottrell, 152 Idaho 387 
(Ct. App. 2012). The Court of Appeals relied on those two opinions in Eddins to clarify 
what constitutes a proximate cause: that the act in question was a reasonable reaction 
to the defendant's criminal conduct, and therefore, the resulting injury was foreseeable. 
See Eddins,_ P.3d _, 2014 WL 503492 at 6-7. Thus, in Corbus, it was reasonable 
for the passenger in the car the defendant was using to elude police to jump from the 
car because he had no other alternative courses of action available to him. Id. at 6 
(discussing Corbus, 150 Idaho at 606). As such, the injuries received when the victim 
hit the ground at speed were foreseeable. Id. Similarly, in Cottrell, it was reasonable 
for the officer to try to restrain the defendant as he was resisting arrest. Id. at 7 
( discussing Cottrell, 152 Idaho at 390). As such, the officer's injury received in the 
ensuing tussle were foreseeable. Id. Therefore, in Eddins, because the victim's 
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reaction to the defendant's verbal threat, which caused acid to subsequently injury his 
eye, the majority concluded that the injuries were foreseeable. Id. 
Applying that perspective to this case, however, a different conclusion is evident. 
There was no immediate threat requiring Mr. Kearl to wantonly ride the dirt bike so that 
it would be wrecked. Compare id.; Corbus, 150 Idaho at 606. Nor was he reacting to 
an attempt to restrain him in some way. Compare Cottrell, 152 Idaho at 390. Rather, 
Mr. Kearl was acting entirely under his own impulse, whereas the victims in Eddins, 
Cottrell, and Corbus were all reacting to the defendant. Therefore, those cases are 
distinguishable from the situation here, where Mr. Kearl was acting in an entirely 
independent manner. And, as discussed at length in the Appellant's Brief, Mr. Kearl's 
reckless and wanton behavior was not reasonably foreseeable to Mr. Davis. Therefore, 
restitution for the damages caused by Mr. Kearl was inappropriate. 
Furthermore, if there is some question about whether or not Mr. Kearl's actions 
were foreseeable, or whether there are issues of contributable negligence that would 
offset a judgment against Mr. Davis, restitution may not be the best forum in which to 
resolve the issue. Eddins, _ P.3d __ , 2014 WL 503492 at 8-10 (Gutierrez, C.J., 
concurring in part and dissenting in part). In Eddins, the Chief Judge reminded the 
majority that "the purpose of the statutory restitution process is to award those 
economic losses caused by the already adjudicated criminal act; the purpose is not to 
search for or speculate as to what act caused the damage." Id. at 10 (emphasis from 
original). Thus, where there are open questions in that regard, the matter would be 
more appropriately resolved in the civil arena. Id. After all, "[t]he restitution statute was 
never meant to be a substitute for a civil action where the law is settled as to damages 
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and the quantum of admissible proof needed to prove those damages." State v. Straub, 
153 Idaho 882, 890 (2013). 
Applying those rules to this case, the record is clear that Mr. Davis caused only 
some of the damage to the dirt bike, but not all (particularly the damage to the frame). 
Therefore, this Court should vacate those portions of the restitution order which are for 
those damages not caused by Mr. Davis. 1 If this Court determines that additional 
hearings are necessary to clarify the value of those damages which Mr. Davis has been 
proved to have caused, then it should remand this case to the district court for that 
limited purpose. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Davis respectfully requests that this Court vacate the restitution order except 
for the award of $397.11 for damages which he concedes he caused. Alternatively, he 
requests that this Court remand the case for the limited purpose of calculating the 
restitution for only the damages he admitted causing. 
DATED this 18th day of February, 2014. 
di4~· 
BRIAN R. DICKSON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
1 The Appellant's Brief breaks down the evidence in the record in this regard. It 
sufficiently proves that Mr. Davis was responsible for $397.11 of the damages. 
(App. Br., pp.20-21.) 
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